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 Mineral resource exploration and exploitation is Africa’s stepping 
stone to further economic development. This is a view that is held by many 
on the continent. The economic benefits associated with ventures in mineral 
resource development and management is now cemented as one of the 
gateways to achieving sustainable economic development for countries that 
are rich in mineral resources on the continent.1  The exploitation of these 
resources has come to also immensely contribute to the expansion of 
infrastructure and development of other areas in a nation’s economy.2 
 
 In Africa, mineral resources are owned by the state, which acts as a 
custodian on behalf of the nation.3Unfortunately, most State governments do 
not have the financial and industrial maturity to fully develop and meet the 
demands involved with the extractive industry in Africa.4 Thus, many such 
governments then rely on multinational corporations [MNCs] to explore or 
exploit the natural resources in this industry on their behalf.5 The MNC is a 
privately owned enterprise that is incorporated in the HC, in most cases it is 
usually the subsidiary company to the parent company, which is registered 
                                                        
1 T Allen ‘The Law relating to Private Foreign Investment in manufacturing in Botswana, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe’ (1992) 4 African Journal International & Comparative Law 44. 
2  N Kofele-Kale ‘The political economy of foreign direct investment: a framework for analyzing 
investment laws and regulations in developing countries’ (1992) 23 Law & Policy International Business 
619. 
3 K Bindemann ‘Production Sharing Agreements: An Economic Analysis’ 8 (1999) available at 
http:www.oxfordenergy.org/pdfs/WPM25.pdf, accessed on 26 December 2013. 
4 JE Strongman (ed) ‘Strategy for African Mining’ (1992) Volumes 23 – 181 x. 
5 WW Hogan, F Sturzenegger & L Tai ‘Contracts and Investment in Natural Resources ‘ in William W. 




and located somewhere else in the world. 6  The MNC brings foreign 
investment into the HC, which in this case is a developing country and owns 
more than one profit making enterprise in many countries. 7   The MNC 
concludes a contract with the HC as the state or a state owned enterprise 
known as an investment contract [IC] in which it cements its decision to invest 
in the development of the mineral resource it has chosen to explore and 
exploit. 8  In addition, it agrees to provide a majority of the finances; the 
specialized know how, technical assistance and expertise.9 
 
 The decision by the MNC is not automatic the HC must first make 
efforts to create an environment that is favourable to attract the MNC.10 The 
HC does so by drafting, redrafting and modifying its policies, regulations and 
national laws in order to increase its chances of receiving investment.11There 
are several terms that are used to refer to ICs in the extractive industry. They 
are sometimes called state contracts due to the fact that the state is a party to 
the contract. 
 
 The determinants of investment project are thus the national mining 
legal regulatory framework [NMLRF] and the contract. The contract is the 
legal undertaking agreed upon by the parties to manage the project.12 It is 
separate from the NMLRF because it comes into existence after the parties 
                                                        
6 JH Dunning ‘Re-evaluating the Benefits of Foreign Direct Investment’ in United Nations the 1990s’ 
(1996) 73 -101. 
7 Ibid. 
8 L Cotula ‘Investment Contracts and sustainable development: How to make contracts for fairer and 
more sustainable natural resource investments’ (2010) 20 Natural issues available at 
http://pubs.iied.org/17507IIED, accessed on 27 July 2013.  
9 United Nations Commission on Trade and Development World Investment Report 2006 ‘ FDI from 
Developing and transition Economies: Implications for Development’ July 2006 available at 
http://unctad.org/en/Docs/wir2006_en.pdf, accessed on 26 December 2013. 
10 T Fredriksson ’Forty Years of UNCTAD research on UNCTAD’ (2003) 12 3 Transnational Corporations 
1 at 8. 
11 B Land ‘Capturing a fair share of fiscal benefits in the extractive industry’ (2009) 18 1 Transnational 
Corporations 157. 
12 L Cotula op cit (note 8) at 4. 
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have discussed and negotiated the terms and conditions.13 The NMLRF is 
already existing and it is what the investors use to determine whether to 
invest in the HC. The parties also use the NMLRF during the negotiations of 
the contract. This is to ensure that the terms and conditions that they have put 
in the contract comply with the principles of national law.  
 
The HC’s drafting of policies; regulations and national mining laws 
that will promote its social, economic development goals cannot be 
underestimated. The national policies, regulations and laws that relate to the 
development of the minerals are a very important guide for the HC before 
and after the negotiation of the contract. The fact that the HC owns the subject 
matter to the contract and has enacted laws that will bring investment is not 
enough. The policies, regulations and laws must reflect the HCs development 
agenda for the sector and the provisions there must be coherent in terms of 
content. ICs in the mining sector do not focus on incentives that are given to 
the investor anymore they now have a broader outlook on the development 
of the country which involves the consideration of other issues like 
governance, transparency, public participation, protection of the environment 
and the observance of human rights.14 
 
 There are different categories of ICs depending on what parties wish 
to achieve in their contractual arrangement.15 In this dissertation we will focus 
on economic development agreements [EDAs], these are agreements that are 
commonly used in the development of mineral resource projects in Africa. 
They are also popular because in some instances the HC does not have an 
adequate NMLRF to regulate the project and the existing law cannot deal with 
                                                        
13 L Cotula ‘Sustainable Markets Investment Briefing 4: Foreign Investment Contracts’ August 2007 
available at http://www.pubs.iied.org/17015IIED.html, accessed on 2 February 2014. 
14 Ibid. 




changing circumstances during the operation of the contract.16  In the MNCs 
case, it is for its protection, it wants a guarantee that the state will not tamper 
with the investment. This is because in Africa the development and 
management of the mining sector is linked to both the economic and political 
spheres of a country, which means that for the project to survive dramatic 
changes like changes of government, sustainable measures must be taken 
before hand to guarantee that the project continues with little disruptions.17 
 
 EDAs are contracts with dual capacity, first, as legal arrangements that 
regulate the investment project and second, as documents that contain rights 
and obligations, which affect the economic and social interests of a nation.18 
The main aim of EDAs is to bring about short and long term economic 
development and improve the welfare and livelihoods of the people. 19 
Unfortunately, this is not the case in Africa. One of the challenges that are 
faced by countries rich in mineral resources [CRIMRs] is the failure of EDAs 
to bring about sustainable economic development. 20  
 
 One of the prevalent factors to this challenge is the negotiation process; 
this is the process that starts the contractual process.21 It is in this process that 
the parties undertake to discuss their terms and obligations in relation to the 
project; it is where they also get to know each other’s interests, strengths and 
weakness.22 This is the process that allows the HC the opportunity to set the 
                                                        
16 R Dolzer & C Schreuer (ed) ’Principles of International Investment Law’ (2012) 72. 
17  R Kraemer & R van Tuler ‘Internationalization of the TNC’s from the Extractive Industries: a 
Literature review’ (2009) 18 No.1 Transnational Corporations 137 at 138. 
18 AFM Maniruzzaman ‘The Relevance of Public International Law in Arbitrations Concerning 
International Economic Development Agreements: An Appraisal of Some Fundamental Aspects’ (2009) 
Journal of World Investment and Trade 263. 
19 African Development Bank Report (2007) ‘Natural Resources and Sustainable Development in Africa’ 
available at http://www.afdb.org/en/knowledge/publications/african-development-report/african-development-
report-2007, accessed on 20 August 2013. 
20 L Cotula op cit (note 8) at 7.  
21 African Economic Outlook (2013) ’Structural Transformation and Natural Resources’ available at 
http://www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/fileadmin/uploads/aeo/PDF/Pocket%20Edition%20AEO2013-
EN.web.pdf, accessed on 27 July 2013.   




tone for the investment. The HC must make sure that the terms and conditions 
in the contract comply and promote the policies, regulations and mining 
national laws in the country in order to set out a standard of performance for 
the MNC in its contractual obligations.23 In addition, where the HC does not 
set some kind of standard for the MNCs operation in the country the MNC 
may take advantage of this and formulate strategies that will negatively affect 
the HCs development goals through the project. 24 
 
Until recently, the importance of the negotiation process has been 
neglected in many CRIMRs. One of the reasons is that in their quest to attract 
investors these HCs have neglected to formulate policies, regulations and to 
a greater extent national mining laws that reflect the consideration and 
commitment to their country’s development agenda. The HCs have also failed 
in some cases to include provisions in the national legislation that effectively 
manage the projects and the MNC or to enforce such provisions where they 
exist.25 The NMLRF influences the contractual negotiation process and the 
neglect to address this area is demonstrated in the negotiation process.  
 
This process precedes the conclusion of the contract and it is in this 
process that problems emerge. These problems then influence the conclusion 
the contract. In that they lead to the HC accepting clause or terms that are 
against their national interest. The interests here are the country’s social and 
economic development agenda. These need to be protected and given 
attention when negotiating EDAs. However, what happens instead is the 
contract is formulated in such a way that it does not benefit the nation but 
those that have an influence in how it is drafted.26 This influence results in the 
                                                        
23 Ibid 144. 
24  Global Witness Report (2007) ‘Heavy Mittal; A State within a State: the inequitable Mineral 
Development Agreement between the Government of Liberia and Mittal Steel Holdings NV’ October 
2006 available at http://www.globalwitness.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/mittal_steel_en_oct_2006_high_res.pdf, 
accessed on 12 June 2013. 
25 L Cotula op cit (note 13.)  
26 L Cotula op cit (note 8) at 3. 
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contract losing its quality as an EDA because the clauses that embody the 
contract do not reflect the government’s intentions of achieving social and 
economic development. 
 
 Thus the HC must protect its national interests, which are its 
sustainable social, economic development and growth. The HCs behaviour 
during the negotiation process has the potential to introduce and increase the 
existence of negative factors to development. 27  In brief these factors are 
administrative and social factors like the lack of transparency, public 
participation, weak governance, political influence corruption and bribery.28 
Unlike the lack of an adequate regulatory framework that influences the 
content some of these factors influence the environment in which the 
negotiations are done. Others factors are the imbalances that exist at the onset 
when negotiating, these are the lack of resources and capacity in relation to 
the technical expertise, information or finance and specialized know how.29 
The factors put the HC in a difficult position because they weaken its 
bargaining power and tilt the negotiating power in the MNC’s favour.30 The 
identification of these factors is what has been used to explain the reason 
behind why the HC concludes contracts that are against national interests.  
 
The negotiation process is influenced by the negative factors 
mentioned above, which also hamper development. The existence of these 
negative factors and an inadequate national legal regulatory framework raises 
many questions as to whether the HC negotiated the contract to serve national 
interest or a few individuals. These questions will not arise where the HC has 
committed to developing development policies, mining regulations and laws 
that can adapt to changing circumstances and have social and economic 
                                                        
27 Ibid 13. 
28 African Economic Outlook (2013) op cit (note 21) at 152.  
29 Ibid p 5. 
30  UNCTC Report (1992) ‘Formulation and Implementation of foreign investment policies selected 
issues’ available at http://unctc.unctad.org/data/e92iia21h.pdf accessed on 30 July 2013. 
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development as their focus. This will produce results that will guarantee the 
HC the right amount of economic competiveness in order for the HC to meet 
its social and economic development goals.31Further, it would also curtail the 
MNCs chances of formulating a strategy that obstructs the HCs course to 
development by regulating the MNC’s operations and offering a better 
negotiating environment.32 
 
 The HCs strategy to concede vital interests with the hope of recovering 
them at renegotiation does not work. These contracts are for a long period of 
time and renegotiation is usually frozen for a long time in some cases until 
the MNC has achieved the profits it wanted. This is because in making the 
investment the MNC is accepting a lot of risk so they will do all they can to 




 This dissertation seeks to examine how factors like weak and 
incoherent mining laws, weak governance, transparency and accountability 
measures, political influence and negotiating power negatively contribute to 
the negotiation of EDAs in the mining extractive industry of countries that are 
rich in mineral resources like Malawi. The analysis of these factors is to 
provide a better understanding why countries like Malawi enter into EDAs 
on containing terms and conditions that are against their national interest, 
which in the cases of these contracts are their social and economic 
development goals. The conclusion of EDAs by countries that want to further 
their economic development is not reflected in the terms they agree to. Thus 
                                                        
31 Ibid. 
32 Global Witness Report (2007) op cit (note 24) at 5. 
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the conclusion of these contracts fails to serve the underlying goal, which is 
to advance social and economic development. 
 
When the HC negotiates with the MNC there are points where each 
party may have to concede certain things. In the case of the HC is sometimes 
concedes beyond what is reasonable in terms of national law and 
international standards. In some instances the other terms are not included or 
they are drafted in such a flexible way that the MNC escape them. Thus the 
terms and obligations agreed upon in the contract do not bring about the 
desired economic and social development. Instead the country continues to 
move further and further away from achieving these goals. The equitability 
in these contracts is discovered when assessments are done on how much the 
country has benefited from the project and it is found that the benefits are 
minimal. 
 
 The discussion will focus on the initial stages of the contractual process 
where the negative factors outlined above are either already existing or are 
created as the parties start to interact during negotiation. The aim is to discuss 
the influence of the factors to the contracting process and then later how the 
decisions made here impact the terms agreed upon in the contract. Factors 
like national mining laws and policies will be considered as one of the factors 
that influence the negotiation process and thereby the clauses that are 
concluded. During the negotiations national mining laws offer general 
regulation and guidance to the drafting of the contract during the negotiation 
on process. 
 
 The HCs failure to negotiate favourable terms in EDAs is a common 
problem in the extractive industry of countries rich in mineral resources in 
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Africa. 33 As a result, it has become a focal and sensitive issue in Africa. The 
main reason for choosing Malawi is because it has been possible to secure a 
valuable case to study, which means a greater level of comprehensive 
research. In addition, information specifically relating to the contract is now 
available and it is now possible to do a case study focusing on the contract. 
Thus this case study is being done in order to critically look at and discuss the 
aforementioned problem.  
 
 The dissertation will therefore argue that there are considerations that 
an HC like Malawi must take into account when coming to the negotiating 
table in order to first of all determine its own interests and then to find ways 
to secure more or reasonably fair terms that will benefit national interests. It 
will be argued that these interests are often defined by Malawi’s national 
policies and legislation on economic, mining, environmental and social 
development. As it stands the implementation and operation of EDAs tends 
to illustrate that factors; like not having national policies on, stringent 
regulations, adequate national mining laws, weak governance and 
transparency measures work against the effective regulation of the mining 
project.34Consequently, HCs like Malawi find themselves with limited control 
on how to regulate the MNC and its operations on the project.35 
 
 The dissertation further examines the reasons behind the inadequate 
regulation and formulation of EDAs in the negotiation process. It argues that 
attention must be paid to drafting policies and regulations that can then be 
used to draft national legislation and regulations in the extractive industry. 
There must be a promotion of greater transparency and accountability in 
                                                        
33 G Bainkong ‘Africa Wants Harmonized Manual for Negotiating Mining Contracts’ July 2013 available 
at http://allafrica.com/stories/201307050002.html, accessed 20 August 2013. 
34 L Cotula ‘Reshaping contracts for quality natural resource investments’ March 2013 available at 
http://pubs.iied.org/17147IIED, accessed on 25 June 2013.  
35 N Nsiku ‘Assessing Incentives in Malawi’ Trade Knowledge Network/International Institute for 
Sustainable Development Policy Brief December 2012 available at 
http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2013/assessing_investment_incentives_malawi.pdf, accessed on 9 December 2013. 
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increasing openness in EDA negotiations. The HC must modify its mining 
laws and stick to their long-term agendas. Further the HC must seek more 
guidance in the negotiation process by employing the assistance of 
experienced experts in the field of EDAs negotiations and commit to train its 
own personnel in the area. There must be consideration of periodic reviews 
of the terms of EDAs based on agreeable parameters, proper consideration of 
interests that serve the nation and the HC political elite must shift their vision 
from the short term monetary gain to longer sustainable ventures that include 
the nation’s interests.36  
 
 Finally the dissertation endeavours to show that if an HC like Malawi 
negotiated the EDAs on terms that were strong in the sense that they were not 
vague and hard to ignore, it would limit the negative impact of issues that 
arise from the contracts after it comes into operation. In addition, this will also 
mean that the parties should also put in place measurable performance 





 This research has been conducted through an analysis of views and 
opinions expressed by scholars in textbooks, journals, online publications and 
relevant case law in the form arbitral decisions.  In brief, scholars have 
indicated that due to their intrinsic inadequate economic standing, 
developing countries will seek to attract foreign investment and in their 
efforts to do so they will concede to accept unfavourable terms to be included 
in the EDAs that they sign. The effect of this is that the terms agreed upon do 
not serve national interest and do not bring about sustainable development. 
                                                        
36 EI Nwogugu (ed) ‘The Legal Problems of Foreign Investment in Developing Countries’ (1965) 187. 
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In addition, selected aspects of EDAs concluded by different African countries 
will be discussed and analysed and these will be compared to the EDA that 



























The formulation of EDAs as contracts is done through the agreement of terms, 
which are included in the contract through the consent of the parties. This 
contract is separate from the policies, regulations and national laws. The 
negotiation of the terms in the contract must however be in line with the 
policies, regulations and national mining laws. EDAs are contracts that focus 
on socio economic and development issues of a country. Their drafting must 
therefore take into account the NMLRF that looks at the issues stated. In order 
for the HC to derive the benefits that they envision for the country this 
contract must capture the provisions in the NMLRF. Most countries in Africa 
fail to derive sustainable benefits from projects that have been contracted 
through EDAs because the NMLRF is inadequate to effectively deal with such 
projects. A NMLRF is very important when formulating EDAs because it 
offers the HC guidelines or a standard on which the HC and the MNC must 
formulate the EDA. Thus in order to understand the importance of the HCs 
having a NMLRF it is key to first have an understanding of the development 
and progression of EDAs. This chapter will therefore look at the development 
and legal significance of EDAs as contracts and components of the national 





2. The progression of Economic Development Agreements 
  
The United Nations General Assembly resolution 1807 (XVII) of 14 
December 1962, "Permanent sovereignty over natural resources” 
revolutionized the management of natural resources in developing 
13 
 
countries.37 The resolution gave ownership in the natural resources to the 
developing countries and cantered mineral resource agreements signed by 
these countries on economic developments.38 Previously, the contracts that 
applied to private foreign investment were known as concession agreements. 
These were the agreements that were mostly found in the extractive industry 
before the UN resolution.39Concession agreements are agreements where a 
“private company [MNC] is granted the exclusive right to explore, produce 
and market mineral resources.” 40  The increase in state influence has 
transformed how these contracts are now handled and viewed by the parties. 
41 
  
The concession agreements that existed before the UN resolution 
granted the investor unlimited rights for exploration.42 In the long run the 
investor would then assume complete control over the development of the 
mineral.43It would also not have an obligation to produce.44In the end these 
agreements were more beneficial for the investor than the state because the 
investor operated as it saw fit.45 Most African leaders signed them without 
understanding their implications. Where the leaders did know of the 
implications they deliberately resolved to not care about them as they cared 
more about the gains that they were receiving personally.46 Where the leaders 
saw their chance of gaining immense personal benefits they saw no need to 
bargain for better terms.47 This sentiment has not changed; traits of it can still 
                                                        
37 UN General Assembly Resolution 1803 (XVII) "Permanent sovereignty over natural resources" 14 
December 1962 available at http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/1803(XVII) accessed 
27 July 2013. 
38 Ibid. 
39 EI Nwogugu op cit (note 36) at 187. 
40 M Likosky ‘Contracting and Regulatory issues in the oil and Gas and Metallic Minerals Industries’ 
(2009) 18 1 Transnational Corporations 1 at 2. 
41 AFM Manunizzuman ‘The New Generation of Energy and Natural Resource Development 
Agreements: Some Reflections’ (1993) 11 Journal on Energy & Natural Resources Law 207 at 211. 
42 Z Gao(ed) ‘International Petroleum Contracts: Current Trends and New Directions’ (1994) 11-14. 
43 Ibid. 
44 R Dolzer and C Schreuer op cit (note 16) at 72.  
45 M Sornarajah ‘The international Law on foreign Investment’ (2004) 40. 
46A Bebbington, L Hinojosa & D Humphreys Bebbington et al ‘ Contention and Ambiguity: Mining and 




be seen in CRIMRs whether forcefully constituted or democratically elected. 
In addition, there were no measures of accountability on which to hold the 
investor accountable to in terms of production period and the state did not 
take a significant part in the production, economic development remained 
stagnant.  
  
 The changes that came in the 1960’s did away with the old 
characteristics of the concession agreements.  The underlying character of 
concession agreements was not done away with completely. The concession 
agreement was revised and restructured. These were a better form of 
concession contracts because the old concession agreements did not benefit 
the HC.48 The concession agreements are still being used in the mineral sector 
but new forms of agreements have also developed from this restructuring and 
revision.49  These contracts now focus on the balancing of interests of the 
parties and accountability measures. 
 
 The concession agreements that were used in the 1960’s were 
considered to be something of the past and several scholars reconsidered the 
term assigned to such agreements. 50   They reasoned that the appellation 
“concession” was out of date and this understanding did not consider the 
two-fold effect of the agreement. Thus EDAs were born.51 These agreements 
focus on economic development as a goal for the natural resource project.52 
This makes the country’s development policy a part of the contract. The 
agreements that became popular in the extractive industry were collectively 
called “new generation agreements”.53 Examples of these agreements are joint 
                                                        
48 W Peter (ed) ‘Arbitration and Renegotiation a of International Investment Agreements’ (1995) 9. 
49 Ibid. 
50 J Hyde ‘Permanent Sovereignty and over Natural Wealth and Resources’ (1956) 50 American Journal 
of International Law 854 at 862; ADM McNair ‘The General Principles of Law Recognized by Civilized 
Nations’ (1957) 33 British Yearbook of International Law 1 at 2- 4. 
51 AFM Maniruzzaman ‘The New Generation of Energy and Natural Resource Development 
Agreements: Some Reflections’ (1993) 11 Journal on Energy & Natural Resources Law 207 at 224. 
52 EI Nwongugu op cit (note 36) at 167. 
53 AFM Maniruzzaman op cit (note 41) at 209. 
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ventures, production sharing contracts, service contracts and management 
contracts.54 The agreements differ where state ownership, control and level of 
direct management by the state are concerned. 55  These factors are what 
introduced the different terms for the contracts. Another factor that changed 
the terminology was economic development. An agreement where the focus 
is on the HC granting MNC rights to explore and exploit its mineral resources 
for the HCs economic development is considered to be an economic 
development agreement. 
  
 EDAs have managed to attain a balance between economic 
development and the profit expectations of the investor. The “new generation 
agreements” came about as a result of the principle of sovereignty, which 
introduced greater protection for HCs in the ownership and control of natural 
resources. So the main difference between contracts like EDAs and the old 
concession agreements is in the rights they vest in the investor, with EDAs the 
states right in management of the mineral resource has increased. The 
investor’s rights are also clearer in the case of EDAs than with concession 
agreements. Further, EDAs also introduced accountability measures on the 
part of the investor, which was not the case before.56 
  
 Thus EDAs agreements in the extractive industry are classified as 
EDAs because the project they are contracted for deal with natural resources 
and the economic development of the country. However, the contracts are 
then termed differently because of the nature of the right they give to the 
MNC. The level of engagement between the HC and the MNC is what will 
determine the difference in terminology. For example with joint ventures the 
MNC has a contractual right and the HC maintains title and ownership.57 
                                                        
54 AFM Maniruzzaman op cit (note 18) at 269. 
55 E Laryea ‘Contractual arrangements for resource investment’ in Francis N. Botchway’s (ed) ‘Natural 
Resource Investment and Africa’s Development’ (2011) 110. 
56 Ibid at 225. 
57 Ibid at 212. 
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While with production sharing contracts the MNC is a contractor who shares 
with the HC in the production of the natural resource.58 
 
3. The legal nature of EDAs  
 
 The unique features of EDAs arise from the fact that they deal with 
natural resources and are linked to the achievement economic development. 
They are not ordinary contracts because they are concluded between a private 
company and a state. 59  They are also not treaties in terms of public 
international law.60 With EDAs the HC contracts as a private entity but within 
the project and contract it exercises both private and public powers.61  So 
EDAs is a private contract and it has such characteristics.62 However, when 
the HC is exercising its powers in the project and to some extent the contract 
itself it exercises both public and private powers.63  For example, where a 
dispute arises because the MNC failed to fulfil its obligations the HC will 
exercise its private powers to claim and where the HC changes its legislation 
and directly affects the project this is the HC exercising its public powers.64 
Thus, in the exercise of its public powers the HC contracts for the sake of 
public interest. In doing so it endeavours to achieve its public policy goals of 
development, which are in the state’s public or administrative area.65 The 
contract is concluded to advance economic, social and development goals that 
are vital to the HC as a country.  
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 The description of EDAs is attributed to their nature and 
characteristics. 66 They are long-term contracts between the HC and a locally 
registered MNC for the exploitation of mineral resources where the MNC will 
provide the capital to fund the project.67 In return the HC will give the MNC 
incentives like ‘freedom from export and import duties, exemption from 
taxation and in some cases special facilities with regard to foreign exchange 
and exemption or reduction in rates.’ 68 Lastly, the rights that the parties have 
against each other are based on the contract.69 
 
 EDAs are sui generis contracts in that they contain characteristics that 
are unique to them.70 The parties choose the law that governs EDAs. This 
follows the principle of party autonomy that is found in private contract law. 
In this transaction the state contracts with the MNC as a private entity. 71 The 
law of the HC does not automatically govern the contract; the parties must 
choose it as the law that will govern the contract. The automatic application 
of any national law will only be possible where the parties have not made any 
choice on the law applicable to the contract and the application of any national 
law is the result of the application of private international law. 
 
 EDAs are therefore private contracts; that are concluded with the state 
as a contracting party. Private international law principles may also be 
applied to EDAs. 72  These principles include the principle of party of 
autonomy, which allows the parties to make a choice of applicable law to their 
contract. 73  This choice leads to the contract being governed by different 
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possible systems of law.74 There is no cemented definition for EDAs, what are 
used to identify mining agreements as EDAs are the characteristics the 
agreement has. 75  However, after much work in the area, AFM 
Maniruzzaman has offered one that comes close to capturing what EDAs are. 
He says that EDAs are 
 ‘a legal framework of relationship purporting to create, in general, a 
suitable legal environment for a long-term investment and to delineate, in 
particular, the mutual rights and obligations between the contracting parties 
i.e. the conceding State, on the one hand, and the foreign entity, on the other.’76 
  
4. The applicable law to drafting EDAs  
 
 The law of the HC traditionally governed state contracts in the mineral 
resource sector.77 The application of the principle of autonomy is now rooted 
in these contracts. 78   Once the parties have made a choice the dispute 
resolution body that will resolve the contractual disputes between the parties 
must give effect to this chosen law.79  The principle also allows parties to 
choose the dispute resolution body and the rules in which such a dispute will 
be resolved.80  
 
 The parties can choose national legal systems or international 
commercial law but it is a more advisable course of action to include both 
systems of law.81 Where the parties choose international commercial law, the 
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mandatory provisions in the national law are still applicable. 82 In the event 
that the provisions clash and the parties must include in the clause which 
provisions will prevail.  
  
 Currently the trend is to move the contract from local laws and 
regulation and to instead use laws that are neutral or general principles of 
international commercial law. The arbitral tribunals have demonstrated this 
approach in many cases. Examples are the arbitration of Anaconda –Iran INC 
v Government of Iran and the National Iranian Copper Industries Company it was 
stated that the tribunal has to pay considerable attention to the party’s choice 
of law being found in the choice of law rules.83 Maritime International Nominees 
Establishment (MINE) v Republic of Guinea, 84  the arbitral tribunal had to 
determine which party had failed to perform in the shipment of bauxite.85 The 
tribunal gave effect to the party’s choice, the parties had chosen that disputes 
would be dealt with by referring to the investment contract and in the case of 
gaps the tribunal had to refer to Guinean law.86 In Zeevi Holdings Ltd v The 
Republic of Bulgaria and The Privatization Agency of Bulgaria in this matter the 
dispute arose from the acquisition of the national carrier Balkan airlines.87 The 
tribunal applied Bulgarian law because the parties in the Privatization 
Agreement expressly chose it.88 
 
5. The legal framework provided by EDAs 
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 The laws of a country are one of the determinants to an investment.89 
The investment project will be governed but the contract as the principle 
document of the project. The party’s interests and goals motivate the 
investment as the legal regime that regulates the project.90 EDAs contain the 
economic development goals of a country. This means that they contain some 
the country’s policies and development strategy.91 When a dispute arises the 
first point of reference is the agreement this is where the tribunal will start in 
order to identify the applicable law and determine the matter.  
 
The contract is taken as part of the legal framework that regulates the 
investment and the project because it contains the specific issues that the 
parties have agreed to. The relevance of national law is that it offers guidance 
to the parties; the parties must ensure that they draft the contract in line with 
the provisions in national law. The importance of this is that national law 
contains the HCs development agenda, which is a goal they are trying to meet 
in commencing the project. Thus national mining laws must be flexible 
enough to adapt to the changes that usually arise in the sector and they must 
be updated to ensure that the contract that is concluded reflects this.  
 
 The value the contract serves as a legal document is also seen where if 
there are inconsistencies; the contractual provisions may supersede national 
law if those provisions are inconsistent with the contract provision. 
 
6. Conclusion of EDAs  
 
6.1 Procedure 
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 The first point of reference when an investor is interested in a mineral 
is the HCs national mining law. As previously mentioned most mining laws 
in Africa are inventive focused and favourable to the investor. In the mining 
industry exploration usually happens through a concession system.92 In brief, 
the investor will apply for a prospecting license using the national mining 
law; this license allows the investor to study the area in order to determine if 
there are minerals that can be explored for development and economic 
profit.93 When the mineral is discovered, they then the investor can apply for 
a mining license,94 which then allows the exploitation of the mineral. The right 
that the HC gives the investor is a concession, as a concessionaire the investor 
is the holder of the mining rights and will be the owner of what it produces 
from the mine.95Concession agreement is what governs the concessionaires 
operations in terms of exploration. In these agreements the parties employ a 
tax and royalty system but unlike before the HC has direct participatory and 
management role.96 
 
 In order to conclude the contract the investor primarily focuses on the 
economic returns.97 While the HC considers the value that this project will 
add to its economic, social and development goals.98 The parties’ interests are 
crucial to the drafting of the contract so before the parties negotiate they must 
establish their interests. Interests determine the terms and conditions of the 
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contract. 99 The state and the MNC, jointly participate in the decision-making 
process with regard to the contract.100 
 
 Practice has shown that contracts are important devices that allow the 
HC to properly regulate them.101 Accordingly, EDAs control the investor’s 
behaviour in ways that will benefit the HC. 102 As mentioned the old 
concession agreements were biased, they favoured investors, but EDAs 
balance the needs of economic development of the host state with 
expectations of the foreign investor that relate to commerce.103  However it 
has become evident that HCs have a problem in identifying and evaluating 
the benefits to be derived from a particular foreign investment project. Some 
effects are indirect and may not be felt for a long time, while others may be 
difficult to attribute to a foreign investor because domestic conditions or 





6.2 The concept of national interest 
 
 The HC has an obligation to promote national interest. This the HC 
government must do by making sure that the well-being and livelihood of the 
people are its prime objective. This also means that as guardians of the 
mineral resources the HCs must ensure that they serve the people and not the 
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government of the day.105 In Africa there is a problem that the political sphere 
directly influences mineral resource management.  
 
 When an HC is negotiating an EDA its social, economic and 
development goals must always be at the forefront. The HC must make sure 
that it receives reasonable gains in the contract.106 Most countries have failed 
to sign EDAs that truly exhibit this. These contractual clauses in EDAs are also 
supposed to deal with the social and environmental issues like environmental 
protection, community development, human rights protection. These are 
aspects that are not usually comprehensively addressed in most EDAs but are 
sometimes ignored. It is important to prioritize these issues in order to ensure 
that the MNC’s operations are properly regulated through clear cut 
accountability measures that will ensure sustainable development.  
 
The clauses in EDAs are not drafted isolation; at interpretation some 
clauses are dependent on others. For example the stability clause affects the 
operation of the law in the country being the applicable and the social 
assessment clause affects the community development clause. Thus the HC 
must give careful consideration of this to that ensure has prioritised its 
development goals. It must do so through the balancing of interests not heavy 
obligations to be placed on it. 
 
 The HCs must always ensure that if there is a concession it must not be 
at the expense of national interest and the benefits it derives from the contract 
must not appear unreasonable. It is the HC’s responsibility to contract on 
terms that ensure that the country will in the long run receive a sizable share 
of the benefits from the contract. The HC must also make sure that the benefits 
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derived from the investment are used in a sustainable way; meaning that the 
government must put in place mechanisms that will ensure that the political 
leadership will not be able to remove the benefits form the country and place 
them in offshore accounts to be later used for their benefit.107 The mechanisms 
will ensure that the benefits are instead be used to build infrastructure and 
promote other sectors in need of further development.108 
 
 The MNC should also in this regard be held accountable to what they 
promised in the contract. The MNC will usually state in the contract that will 
develop the area where the project is taking place but years go by and there is 
no development. 109  Accountability can be achieved through properly 
structuring the terms in the contract and provisions in national law. Most 
CRIMRs in Africa have a history of depending on one sector and donor aid. 
The conclusion of an EDA should thus reflect considerations of sustainable 
economic and social development that will boost other sectors.110 
 
 In its duty as a sovereign authority the HC contracts to further national 
interest, this is one of the pivotal reasons why it enters into these contracts, in 
doing so the HC is pushing forward its public policy agenda which is 
development and it is also this reason that gives it the right to terminate the 
contract when it sees that its interests are not being served. In Texaco Overseas 
Petroleum Company111 it was stated that that EDAs have a 
 
 “Broad subject matter in that [they involve] more than just the 
transfer of sale and purchase transaction, capital and technology. 
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To the length of the  project close cooperation between the 
parties is important the investor takes a lot of risk, for the state 
the contract is ended into for the sake of national interest there is 
need for the parties to then balance the responsibilities in the 
contract and the interests mentioned and usually contain broad 

















 As more countries in Africa signed EDAs in the extractive industry 
concern grew on the inability of these contracts to achieve sustainable 
economic development. There was need to determine what stage between the 




negotiation process and the conclusion of the contract problems arose. African 
leaders and concerned organizations met and came up with the African 
Mining Vision [AMV].113 In 2009 the leadership in different sectors on the 
continent and internationally saw it necessary to deal with the issue of 
Africa’s failure to capitalize on its resource endowment.114 The agenda of the 
AMV was to take Africa’s mining industry to another level with the hope that 
this would lead to greater development of the economies of countries in such 
positions. 115 To achieve this, the AMV sought to address a very crucial area - 
negotiation of EDAs.116 Overtime the navigation and understanding of EDAs 
has become complex and more and more technical in terms of what is 
involved in the conclusion of the contract. 117  There was therefore a need to 
equip and improve the negotiation capacity of negotiators in the African 
states.118 The AMV outlined what the African states hoped to achieve in the 
extractive industry and the areas of concern.119 One of the areas mentioned as 
hampering economic development was the contract itself and this was with 
regard to its conclusion but more specifically the negotiation process that led 
to the conclusion of the contract.120 This chapter shall identify and critically 
analyse the factors that affect the process of negotiation of EDAs.  
 
2. How negotiation is done  
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 Negotiation is a process that involves each party’s skills and powers to 
tactfully influence the conclusion of an agreement.121 It is a process where the 
parties bargain with each other and the success of the outcome is highly 
dependent on the preparation beforehand. 122  When the party’s meet to 
negotiate, the process is influenced by several factors; some exist before the 
negotiation takes place and others come up during the negotiations due to the 
party’s reactions to circumstances.123 There are therefore factors that have a 
huge push and significant pull for either party. 
 
 For a negotiation process to be effective there are preliminary things 
that have to be set. Firstly, the parties' preparedness; Secondly, the parties' 
strategy; thirdly, the agenda of what will be discussed and fourthly the parties 
have to have knowledge of the other party's strengths and weaknesses.124 The 
careful consideration of these in the context of what is available to the parties 
has the potential to produce the desired success. However, the preliminary 
steps cannot be set without consideration of the issues that surround the 
negotiation. When the parties negotiate each party comes with something to 
offer the other, these are necessary components for the contract to be 
operational.125 These are things like the capital, the technology, the technical 
and legal know-how, and various sets of information that span from the 
subject matter to the dealings in the negotiations and capacity.126 
 
 Ideally the HCs should be aware of the situation that they are in and 
this awareness should lead to how they negotiate in order to use these factors 
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in a way that is advantageous to them.127 It is customary for an HC to wait for 
the renegotiation to fight for better terms after the contract has been operating 
for decades. 128  This procedure of acquiring leverage after the contract is 
operational and has not produced the desired results in that it has proven to 
be an ineffective way to negotiate.129 The negotiation process is more than a 
discussion where the parties agree on the terms of the contract. It serves as 
proof of the HC’s intentions, that the political rhetoric for development was 
more than just talk but an actual agenda for development.130 
 
3. Factors that influence the process 
 
3.1 National policy and law  
 The contract and the national law perform different roles in the 
conclusion of EDAs. The contract is the document that embodies the specific 
interests of the parties that national law failed to address. While national law 
regulates mining in the country, it manages the administration and 
development of the mining. 131  In the contract the parties’ deal with the 
specific project that they are contracting on and national law refers to general 
principles that will be applicable between the parties, thus the use of national 
law is of general application.132 In some instances national law can also have 
provisions that refer to specific mining contracts. In conclusion, the contract 
is a document tailor made by the parties to apply to a specific project,133 while 
national law has general application.  
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 The relevance of national law to the contractual negotiations is that, the 
parties must ensure that the terms and obligations agreed upon must be in 
line with the principles set out in national law. 134 However, they do not have 
to apply all the provisions in national law unless these provisions are 
mandatory. These they cannot evade. The problem that exits in the 
negotiation of the contract is that the contract supersedes national law because 
the terms and obligations do not follow the principles in national law.135 They 
go beyond what is set in national law and are unreasonable because the 
achieve less or are less effective compared to what is said in national law.  
 The inadequacy in national law is what leads to this. It does not only 
affect the parties earlier of choosing to sign a contract but also the clauses that 
are drafted in the contract. Most mining laws in African were reformed 
because they did not consider issues like community development, 
transparency, public participation and human rights protection. These have 
changed how the clauses in EDAs are drafted. They have to be balanced with 
the other clauses like the fiscal regime clause and the stability clauses. Since 
the negotiations of EDAs have to be in line with national law it means that the 
clauses are to some extent influenced by national law. However, where 
national law does not comprehensively provide for transparency, public 
participation or human rights protection the contract will in turn not have this 
as part of its focus.  This will then lead to a contract that supersedes national 
law and also fails to bring economic and social development.  
 
 In the 1990’s African governments formulated policies and national 
mining laws to attract investment.136 They were flexible because incentives 
were drafted in the law and risk free environments were created for 
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investors. 137  These incentives were usually in the form of tax reduction, 
rebates and exemptions. The laws that were enacted in CRIMRS had gaps and 
created many loop holes, which meant that they could not adapt to the 
changing circumstances that later followed.138The need to properly regulate 
social concerns in the contract has been ignored in most countries. The failure 
to include such provisions has led to the drafting of EDs that later fail to 
provide the HC with sustainable development. The end result is that benefits 
that are derived for the project do not last long to meet the demands of 
development and help in the growth of other sectors.  
 
 Examples are the 2003 and 2007 gold mining contracts between the 
Government of Tanzanian Government and Pangea Minerals 
Limited. 139 These agreements did not include protection the social and 
environmental concerns that may arise.140 This is because section 10 (c) of the 
Mining Act of 1998 of Tanzania made the inclusion of these provisions 
optional, the parties may include them.141 The absence of these provisions met 
that the government ignored its development policy, as it failed to protect the 
local communities and regulate the MNC through the contractual 
provisions.142Incorporating the provisions would have ‘reinforced’ what is 
stated in national law and given strength to the regulation of the MNC, in that 
they would have been held accountable if they breached the provisions.143 
Contracts like these that failed to achieve social and economic development 
are one of the reasons why Tanzania then enacted a new mining law in 2010. 
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3.2 The Regulation and Monitoring of the MNC 
 
 The MNCs receive immense international protection. As private 
companies their main concern is profits and not necessarily national 
interest.144 The gaps and loop holes in the laws relating to mining especially 
those on taxes have made it easier for these companies to manipulate the 
system.145  They come up with calculated and strategic ways to do this. 146 
This is done after the company has an understanding of the mining codes in 
the country and it solidifies this strategy in the negotiation process where it 
negotiates with the full knowledge of what the concluded terms will bring.147 
 
 MNCs are not fully regulated in the area of international investment 
law on how to deal HCs at beginning of the contract.148  Most of the current 
regulations applicable to MNCs are based on soft law, which is not binding 
on the MNC where accountability is concerned.149 MNCs operating in Africa 
will usually opt out of applying them. This is partly also because of the HC 
governments behaviour in creating negotiating environments that allow the 
MNC to act like this from the beginning of the contractual process.150It is only 
recently that mechanisms have been created to hold MNCs accountable for 
their omissions in the areas of labour, human and environmental rights.151 
The poor regulation of MNC’s behaviour during the negotiation of EDAs 
reduces the HC’s negotiating power. The lack of regulation is one of the 
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factors that have an impact on the negotiation of EDAs because it creates an 
environmental that is favourable to the MNC.152 
 
 An example of an agreement where the MNC exhibited such behaviour 
is the pervious Mittal Holdings Steel Holdings contract with the National 
Transition Government of Liberia.153 Mittal sought to contract in a way that 
‘maximizes its profits by using an international regulatory void to gain 
concession and contracts which strongly favour the corporation over the 
HC’.154 The problem here was that these actions were not illegal because there 
were no standards to hold Mittal hold accountable to, the failure of the HC to 
offer such regulations and there being no regulations internationally allowed 




3.3 The MNCs Strategy 
 
 Both parties have a strategy to the negotiations; the MNCs strategy 
shows more willingness to prepare and the HCs not so much.156 The strategies 
developed are those of the parties choosing. The influential factors to the 
negotiations are the actions that are carried out from the strategies or in 
response to them. The actions influence the negotiations because the MNC 
negotiates based on this strategy. The MNC works out a system of how the 
profits are going to be handled and this is mostly by creating crafty ways to 
take the money out of the country.157 The MNCs knows from experience that 
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most African states do not have tax structures that work properly, where the 
collection of money is properly monitored and documented. 158  They also 
know that they can evade some provisions in national law. 
 
 The strategy that is adopted by the MNC gives it the opportunity to 
escape liability when the contract comes into operation. 159  The MNC 
awareness on how to escape liability affects the negotiation process.160 The 
behaviour of the MNC has more adverse effects if the MNC has global 
dominance. In addition, by the time the MNC negotiates the EDA with 
government negotiators it already has backing from the political 
leadership.161 Thus it then works out further strategies to manoeuvre policies 
and applicable national legislation that will work in its favour.  
 
3.4 Administrative and Institutional factors  
 
3.4.1 Imbalances in Information 
 
 During the exploration period the MNC collects data. The MNC 
collects information so that it can determine whether there is a mineral to 
invest in. This information will assist the MNC to determine how much 
capital it will need for the project, the technology and the sale price.162 In 
comparison the HC will not have as much information, this is partly caused 
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by the HCs lack of capacity and resources to get this information as well as its 
failure to update the information it already has. 163  In most cases at the 
negotiation stage, the HC will usually rely on old maps and data that were 
acquired by previous companies or geological experts. 164  This creates a 
disproportionality of information, as one party will have the facts as they are 
on the ground while the other party-the HC will not. At the negotiation table 
the MNC will have a lot more professional support in terms of people and 
data while the HC will not. 
 
  The HC will trust the MNCs quickly by relying on the information 
provided by the MNC. An example is the agreement between the National 
Transitional Government of Liberia and Mittal Steel Holdings NV. This 
agreement was signed in 2005 it was for the extraction of iron ore and as per 
the terms of the agreement it would be operational for 25 years. 165  The 
agreement was not negotiated on equitably beneficial terms because the 
government of Liberia made no reasonable gain from the project. The 
unreasonableness in the contact was that Mittal received most of the power in 
the project to the point that it was ‘…a state within a state…’166 This contact 
had grave ramifications of the Liberian people because Mittal had more to say 
in how the project was handled than the government.167 One of the reasons 
cited to this imbalance was the negotiation process. The process was 
influenced by several factors including the imbalance of information between 
the parties.168In the contract the government of Liberia gave the Company all 
the geological information it had in relation to the area and it is publicly 
available.169 The company did a feasibility study at the initial stages of the 
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contract to see if the project was economically viable but this was not easily 
accessible for the negotiators in the Liberian government.170  
 
3.4.2 Weak governance  
 
  Governance is the effective and open administration and management 
of the state, where there is accountability and transparency.171 The success of 
the mining industry relies on good governance; there is a link between the 
principles of good governance and mineral resource management, which 
includes contract negotiation. 172 Governance structures in Africa are weak; 
this is due to the continuous inheritance of “old political processes” that are 
pasted down form one government to another. 173 In most African countries 
governance depends on the leadership that is running the country and 
therefore by extension politics. 174  The governance of a country, in most 
African countries, is very centralized, where one person who then fills the 
important positions in government based on loyalty and not merit runs the 
country.175 This is so that they can acquire large sums of money for themselves 
fearing that they will not hold the positions for a long time or in order to 
remain in power longer.176 
 
 The lack of good governance creates a bad negotiating environment for 
EDAs. The government negotiators should be aware and deal with the 
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governance issues as they can affect the negotiation process. An example of a 
country that experienced this is Chad; the government signed a contract with 
ExxonMobil, Peltronas and Chevron.177 Chad is a country that was recovering 
economically from civil war and even though it had a democratically elected 
leader, the elections were compromised.178 The leader at the time was vested 
with immense amounts of power and he was above reproach from any one 
including the national assembly.179 This ruling environment meant that Chad 
had a very weak governing structure and the negotiation of the agreement 
was done in such a poor environment. It was clear from this that the 
agreement that was signed would not benefit the People of Chad. 180  To 
counter the effects of the contract measures were taken to protect these 
interests; like the revenues were put in foreign accounts and there was a 
committee set up that included members of the civil society.181 
 
 These efforts were frustrated by the actions of the political 
leadership.182 There creation of new legislation to cater for the agreement was 
seen as a way forward but it was weak and so were the institutions it created. 
Thus it is important to make sure that the NMLRF is drafted with a 
development agenda in mind and the institutions that are created from such 
legislation can effectively manage and monitor the sector. 183   Some ways 
would be to regulate the MNC’s behaviour in the HC or introduce 




                                                        




181 Ibid at 33. 
182 Ibid at 34. 
183 B Campbell et al ‘Factoring in governance is not enough. Mining codes in Africa, policy reform and 
Corporate responsibility’ (2003) No. 1 Mineral & Energy-Raw Materials Report 2. 
37 
 
 Transparency is simply the act of making information that affects the 
nation available.184 This is an area in the mining industry that has received a 
lot of attention and increased regulation. Transparency is linked to public 
participation, access to information and accountability, which are all crucial 
to EDA negotiations.185 If the government is transparent with the MNC and it 
allows the public access to this information it ensures that the contractual 
negotiations focus on sustainable development of the mineral resource.186 
 
 Transparency is crucial to the negotiation process because where 
contracts have been concluded and parties have not been transparent in their 
dealings it has had long lasting consequences on the HC.187 Transparency is 
usually lacking in areas where the MNC applies for a license, the biding to be 
awarded and license one and the negotiation process. 188 In the negotiation 
process the agreement will be negotiated in secret, in cases where there is 
political influence the actions of the parties will not be clear in that the public 
will not know what the parties agreed to and there will be no public 
participation in the process.189 The inclusion of the public and allowing access 
to information pertaining to the contract and project will guarantee greater 
transparency in the contract and thus a deal that captures national interest at 
the core of it.190 
 
 The inclusion of these principles will be in the NMLRF that is drafted 
with development as its goal.191 Transparency through public participation of 
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the civil societies or parliament is currently ignored in most CRIMRs.192 A 
country that has exhibited such failures in transparency is Angola. 193  In 
Angola the government created a policy to benefit local companies but 
instead this policy has increased cases of secrecy.194 The agreement a state 
owned company Sonangol and Cobalt a US company.195 This contract was not 
transparent, Cobalt agreed to work two companies that were recommended 
by Sonangol.196 This demonstrates the lack of transparency that takes place 
when these contracts are being negotiated and the influence that those in 
power will have.197 This contract also raised the issue of corruption, which is 







 Accountability is also a principle found within governance; it is a 
mechanism that allows citizens to seek explanations from those in power, to 
them to task by asking them to explain their actions or omissions.199 This 
furthers transparency and strengthens good governance because when those 
in government are constantly asked to explain their actions relating to the 
management of the mineral resources it strengthens public participation and 
                                                        
Confidential.pdf ,accessed on 8 May 2013 16. 
192 L Cotula op cit (note 195) at 2. 
193 Global Witness Report op cit  (note 24) at 8. 
194 Ibid at 10. 
195 Ibid at 11. 
196 Ibid at 13. 
197J Hammond ‘The Resource Curse and Oil Revenues in Angola and Venezuela’ (2011) 75 No. 3 Science 
& Society 348  at 360. 
198 Ibid. 
199 M Genasci & S Pray Extracting ‘Accountability: The Implications of the Resource Curse for CSR 
Theory and Practice’ (2008) 11 Yale Human Rights & Development Law Journal 37 at 38. 
39 
 
the access people have to information. 200  In the end this will minimize 
behaviour that is contrary to the exploitation of the mineral resources.201 
Accountability is limited by weak governance structures and lack of political 
commitment. An environment that does not allow participation of the 
interested stakeholders and the exchange of information between them and 
the government increases the chances of corruption and bribery.202  
 
 An example of an agreement where accountability was lacking is the 
one National Petroleum Corporation, a state owned company of the Nigeria 
and Shell Corporation, a company from the Netherlands.203 The agreement 
was for exploitation of the oil reserves in the Niger Delta. From the effects that 
came later it is clear that this contract was negotiated and signed in an 
environment that lacked accountability to the people and the company to the 
government.204 Nigeria did not have a comprehensive regulatory framework 
that protected the environment and to regulate the MNCs once operation 
structures. 205  The existence of these factors meant that social and 
environmental issues were not taken into account when the contract was 
negotiated. This is evident from the reactions of the communities that 
surround the area of the projects.206They organized protests and threatened 
to sabotage shell’s operations in the area, which resulted in a huge conflict in 
the area.207 The people in the community felt that the company operations had 
destroyed the environment and had lessened the economic stability of the 
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area for farmers and other producers.208 
 
3.4.5 Weak Administrative institutions 
 
 Different institutions in the government are involved in the 
management and exploitation of mineral resources in their countries. The 
effectiveness of these institutions is partly dependent on effective 
transparency and accountability. In the case of countries that have been in the 
mining industry for a long time, the efforts of these institutions are hindered 
by capacity, accountability and transparency.209 To add to these problems the 
institutions are continuously undermined by political decisions and actions 
which cause problems for the civil servants in the institutions. 210 Due to these 
constraints the institutions are ill prepared to handle the negotiation of EDAs 
because they are weak in comparison with what the MNC has. They usually 
have several well-staffed and financed advisory institutions that have the 
same role as the government institutions. The institutions are also obstructed 
by the lack of information to fully equip themselves of the implications of the 
project when the contract is concluded. This further affects their advisory role 
to the negotiators of the contracts. 
 
 Zambia is a good example to illustrate the problems that are felt by 
government mining institutions. Zambia is one of the countries that 
established several mining institutions to administer, regulate and mange the 
mining industry. The Ministry of Mines and Minerals Development 
administer the Zambian mining sector, under this you find the Mines Safety 
Department. 211  This institution has supervisory role and makes sure that 
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companies comply with ‘health and safety’ regulations. The Environmental 
Council of Zambia is in charge of evaluating and reporting on environmental 
issues. 212  These institutions have little capacity, are unable to give 
comprehensive reports as to what is happening in the industry and their 
enforcement of accountability measures is frustrated by political actions.213In 
2007, a public declaration made by President Mwanawasa that a company 
called ‘BGRIMM’ should commence operations after being closed down 
because the project was had the potential to be harmful to the community and 
therefore needed more study, is example of such actions.214  The duties of the 
institutions are also not carried out properly because there is no funding to 
aid in pushing their agenda.  
 
3.4.6 Political influence 
 
 Politics has a very big influence on how EDAs are negotiated in 
Africa.215 This is not only because of the proximity that the contracts have to 
the political leadership but also the interests and control those in power wish 
to exercise over the contract.216 The structure of political leadership in most 
African states in centred on the president and not necessarily the executive as 
it should be.217 The powers the president holds are so immense that he or she 
has a very direct say in the countries policy goals.218  Hence the President has 
a lot of control in what happens, his or her decision carries a lot of weight in 
the ministries and their decisions are usually not questioned.219The political 
structure and the powers and access the political leadership have, has created 
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an environment that allows the MNC to operate unregulated especially in 
cases where it is the same small group of people in the political leadership 
that is benefiting from the project.220 
 
 An example is Zambia, where the ministries are ran by permanent 
secretaries who are directly appointed by the president and not by the civil 
servants who have experience as they have served for a long period of time.221  
When the mines were privatized the government attained a ‘golden share’ 
where people like permanent secretaries were given a chance to serve as a 
board member. This gave them direct access MNC managers and its 
operations.222 This resulted in a conflict of interest as the permanent secretary 





3.4.7 Bribery and Corruption 
 
  Corruption is bred by lack of transparency. It happens when officials 
who have been tasked with certain duties take advantage of those positions 
and use their power and influence there to orchestrate things for their gain.224 
There is another side to corruption which is bribery this is where a person 
who then receives money or favours in order to aid the person giving those 
things in achieving their goal or making a process easier is receiving a bribe.225 
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Consequently, where the MNC is involved in giving benefits to government 
officials to gain favours and push their investment along it has participated in 
bribery.226 Where the official receives his wages and the bride he is said to be 
corrupt.  
 
 The MNC’s position gives it leverage to extend brides to the political 
leadership and those in high government positions.227 Corruption has a direct 
impact on the negotiation process. Corruption or bribery hampers the 
progress transparency and accountability can bring to the sector and 
negotiation process.228  Corruption thrives in African states because of the 
dysfunctional political structure and management of administrative 
institutions.229 The failure by the HC to draft laws that can properly regulate 
the sector adds to this problem. An example is the agreement between the 
Government of Guinea and Beny Steinmetz Group Resources.230 This was for 
the mining if bauxite in Guinea.231 The company acquired the license through 
corrupt practices and its operations were ceased because it went under 
investigation as a result of these issues.232 
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To negotiate these contracts the HC must have capacity and resources. 
It must commit its financial resources to facilitate the building of capacity and 
skill to the negotiation of these contracts. Currently most HC’s in Africa do 
not have the skills, expertise and financial resources to properly negotiate 
these contracts.233 This has become a challenge to the negotiators when they 
face the MNC.234 Most negotiators are not equipped to fully understand and 
appreciate the contracts and their implications once they have been 
negotiated. 
 
 The HC will strengthen its negotiating power by building its capacity 
by improving on the skills and expertise of the negotiators, allocating financial 
resources to the negotiators and the different institutions involved in the 
negotiation process and ensuring that there is no overlap of duties.235 There is 
a need in Africa to improve the capacity of negotiators to these contracts.236 
Factors like lack of negotiating skills, technical expertise, legal expertise and 
specialized know how affect the negotiation process and they generate the 
lack of capacity.237 
 
3.5.2 Negotiating Power 
 
 The power to divert the other parties’ mind-set to one’s own interests 
in an environment that has various interactions at play is negotiating 
power.238 There is a difference between this and bargaining power which is a 
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tool used to determine between the two parties who will walk away with a 
greater percentage of the profits from the project.239 So negotiating power 
establishes a party’s ability to influence the other party and bargaining power 
is what is used to demonstrate these abilities. The MNC bargains for the 
protection of their investment, and a proper forum to determine disputes and 
to realize profits on their investments.240 While, the HC bargains for a share 
in the investment, compliance with its laws and economic development.  
 
 At the commencement of the negotiations HC is usually the one in the 
weaker position compared to the MNC even though it has the subject matter 
and the regulating legal framework. However, with a proper strategy it can 
change its position because if it fails to do so the MNC will use its strategy 
and knowledge of being unregulated. Further the HC’s negotiating power is 
then influenced by the social, economic and political factors that will 
surround the negotiations. 241  The HC’s need for the investment is more 
apparent and immediate than the MNCs risk to invest in the country. 
 
 An example of an agreement that exhibited weak negotiating power 
on the HC’s side is the agreement between the state company Gecamines of 
the Democratic Republic of Congo and Anvil.242 The discovery of this was 
made when the government called for a review of all the contracts that had 
been signed by the state owned company.243 It was discovered that Anvil had 
negotiated a total exemption from royalties and corporate income tax for a 20 
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years.244 This contract reflected the unfairness of the contract that was signed 
because the exemptions that were given were not those that were prescribed 
in the mining codes. This demonstrates what weak negotiating power can do 
faced with a company with a strong bargaining position and thus a strong 
negotiating power. 
 
4. How EDAs fail to cater for national interest 
 
  The management of mineral resources is a very important aspect for 
economic progression in mineral resource rich countries. The development 
and social changes through the proper and effective management of these 
resources is part of the country’s long-term plan. Unfortunately, in Africa this 
is still only on paper and part of political rhetoric.245 Most mining legislation 
focused on incentives and could not adapt to the changing circumstances that 
the agreements bring. These changes have led to the changes in drafting of 
EDAs but not the legislation that regulates the mining activities. Most mining 
legislation did not look to community development, transparency, accessed 
to information, public participation, protection the environment and human 
rights.  
 
In focusing on attracting in the investor the HC did not consider the 
existence of these factors and the effect they will have on the negotiation 
process.246 The mining laws in CRIMRs were centred on economic incentives. 
The economic emphasis was mainly tax related in the hope that the countries 
would derive revenues from the projects to add to the growth of their 
economies. These laws failed to consider the environmental and social impact 
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of these projects.247 The government also failed to enact and put in place 
regulatory and accountability mechanisms that it could use to hold the MNC 
accountable. 248  Where the government created mechanisms its efforts are 
hampered by political influence.  
 
These factors go against the HC’s development goals because they 
influence the drafting of the contracts. The HC contracts to promote economic 
and social development, which is its goal and it must seek to advance it. 
However, because the HC fails to take cognizance of the factors outlined 
above and their influence on the contract it does not negotiate its EDAs 




 The negotiation process is challenged by a lot of factors aside for the 
legislation being inadequate and transparency and accountability measures 
lacking. The negotiators do not have the capacity and resources. All these 
factors add to lessening their bargaining power and negotiating power. The 
result is that these then are then put in the MNCs favour as they come to the 
negotiation table better prepared to handle the negotiations. The MNCs has a 
strategy and will achieve the results its wants. The HCs inefficiency due to 
lack of capacity and lack of information does not work in its favour and the 
HC continues to neglect this fact.249 
 
These contracts are not negotiated without local factors influencing the 
process. Even though the governments change in most in CRIMRs in Africa 
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the way they run their respective governments does not. This has continued 
the cycle of weak governance issues because the institutions that are 
established to manage the mining sector are weak and this situation continues 
with each change of government because those in positions of leadership 
continue to undermine the work these institutions. This is through failing to 
increase the resource capacity in order to strength them. The shortcomings in 
the institutions then mean that make it harder for them to enforce the 
regulatory measures that are provide by the law.  
 
 The weakness in governance means that transparency and 
accountability are lacking. These factors are external to the negotiations but 
they have direct influence on the negotiations because they also influence 
them HC’s actions. The negotiations between parties lack transparency 
because of the HCs actions and weak government structure. The MNCs takes 
advantage of this, when they come into the country. As a private party the 
MNC enters the country with intentions to comply with the laws and 
regulations. However, the HCs behaviour towards the MNC changes this. The 
HC creates an environment that will not be conducive for EDA negotiations. 
The HC creates an environment that will not be conducive for EDA 
negotiations through the direct involvement of the political leadership and 
how it undermines the duties of the institutions.  
 
  Thus the actions of the political leadership in government and the 
environment where the contract is negotiated in have an influence control on 
what is agreed on at the negotiations.  The factors are intertwined in each 
other and they may also operate in the cycle in the case of the HC. These 
factors some of which are created by the MNC, work to its advantage and to 
the detriment of the HC. The existence of these factors obstructs the HC’s from 




 So the failure to safeguard national interest has its origins in the 
negotiation process. Questions have been asked as to why African countries 
that have so many minerals and contracts fail to realize sustainable economic 
development. One of the answers is the negotiations process that is influenced 
by several external and internal factors to the process. For a long time Africa 
has been viewed as the innocent party with the MNC as the one at fault. But 
this is not the case anymore; some of the factors mentioned are brought about 
by the HC itself by its own behaviour. Thus both parties are to blame but the 
HCs take a bigger share.  
 
 In summary, in this chapter we have elaborated on what the 
negotiation process is and have identified and outlined the factors that 
influence the process. These factors are external to the HC as they originate 
from the MNC’s behaviour. There are procedural factors that create the 
negotiation environment. As well as internal factors originating from the HC 
itself, which affect the substantive content of the contract and the negotiating 
environment. Both parties create the factors that influence this process not just 
the HC. The difference however is that the state is accountable to people and 
not shareholders. Its commitment or negligence has extended ramifications 
compared to the MNC.  The HC is there as regulator, enforcer and protector, 
not just as a profit making party. In the next chapter we shall look at Malawi 
a country that has signed several of these contracts and they have failed to 
bring about feasible development, which has led the nation to question how 
the benefits were agreed on. Thus bringing in to focus whether these contract 



























In chapter three the focus was the factors that influence the negotiation 
process in the content of the agreement and the environment in which it is 
negotiated. This chapter will focus the discussion on Malawi. In 2007 the 
Malawi government (GoM) entered into an agreement with Paladin Energy 
Limited (PEL) for the development of the mineral uranium in Kayelekera a 
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town, in the district of Karonga, in the North of the country.250The chapter 
will thus discuss the steps that were taken before the negotiations of the 
contract, in order to demonstrate each party’s preparedness and behaviour 
towards the negotiations. This is will also demonstrate how some factors 
existed before the negotiations. The discussion will then move to the party 
negotiations of the contract itself. The focus will be to identify the clauses that 
were influenced by the negative factors identified in the chapter three. The 
factors will be identified to explain how their influences in the clauses can be 
traced back to the negotiation process, where they arise. The implementation 
of the contract will then be discussed in order to see how clauses affected the 
operation of the contract towards Malawi. The chapter will end with what 
could have been done differently for the clauses to be drafted differently and 
ultimately the negotiations to achieve better results for Malawi. This will then 
explain how Malawi could have achieved an agreement that would have led 
to sustainable development.  
 
2. Steps leading to the Malawi Government and Paladin Energy Limited 
Agreement 
 
 There were several steps that preceded the agreement. PEL first did a 
‘feasibility study’ to see if they could manage the mine before they showed 
any monetary interest.251They found that the project was costly and decided 
not to pursue it. However, in 2000 the company went ahead and bought some 
shares from a company known as Central Electricity Generating Board of 
Great Britain that was exploring the mine at the time. 252  In 2005 PEL 
purchased the rest after completing a study to see if commencing with a 
mining project would bring about the desired results. The study revealed that 
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a mining project would, as economic environment for such a project was 
better.253 
 
PEL applied for a license to acquire mining rights to the mine. The 
company had to submit an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) Report 
in accordance with section 38 of the Mines and Minerals Act.254 It submitted 
its EIA in October 2006. When an applicant applies for a mining license, the 
license cannot be issued without the EIA being approved first. 255  The 
company was issued with a mining license in April 2007 before the EIA was 
approved.256These actions were outside the normal procedure set out in Act.  
 
The government’s actions received opposition and the draft EIA had 
several faults. Some non-governmental organizations [NGOs] took an interest 
and had an independent report done. The report revealed that the draft EIA 
PEL had done had many faults.257It did not reflect that they had granted the 
community in which the mining activity will be done enough information.258 
Further the PEL’s EIA did not have viable information that the public could 
use to evaluate their assessment. 259 The main focus in the PEL’s EIA were 
economic benefits and it did not elaborate on the impact the project would 
have on the not environment as whole.260 
 
From the findings of the independent report the NGO’s commenced 
court proceedings. The group asked the court to grant an injunction in order 
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to halt PEL from commencing operations whilst they waited for the 
substantive issues to be determined.261 The substantive issues were a review 
of the PEL’s EIA that was approved by the GoM. 262 In the pleadings the 
NGO’s wanted the court to stop the Kayelekera project from proceeding 
based on the current EIA and they wanted an independent authority to hold 
public consultations so that PEL takes these into account in order to redesign 
the course of their operations263 The case did not go further; it was withdrawn 
in 2007 because the NGO’s and the GoM reached a settlement. In the 
settlement the GoM agreed to develop legislation to deal with the hazardous 
substance that the project would produce.264 The government however did 
not take the report seriously. It was only given attention by the court but since 
the matter was withdrawn there was little they court could do.265The GoM 
entered into the agreement called a development agreement [DA with PEL in 
April 2007 after the company had acquired the mineral rights and the EIA was 
approved. 
 
The government’s action in issuing the license before the EIA was 
approved was the beginning of the problems it would have in handling PEL 
and its operations in Malawi.266 The GoM was willing to bypass national law 
in order to give PEL favourable conditions to operate. In doing so the 
government was creating an environment that would make it difficult to 
regulate and manage PEL’s behaviour. The GoM should have insisted on an 
elaborate and comprehensive EIA taking into account the mineral that was 
going to be mined the area in which the mine would operate and the level of 
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competence and capacity that the government had to handle environmental 
problems and the communities safety.  
 
PEL operates in other countries and in Australia the regulations that 
PEL has to abide by are more stringent. Australia is more developed so than 
Malawi so it can be argued that it has the means to set such regulations and 
accountability measures to monitor MNCs like PEL. However, this argument 
is not strong because the project is regulated by the contract and not national 
law; the contract contains the specific obligations that are applicable to the 
parties. Thus it is in the contract that an HC can insist on proper management 
of the mineral resource if national law does not afford enough regulatory 
measures. In this regard, a report that properly outlined what measures a 
company will take would have given the GoM a better understanding of what 
obligations to get from PEL in the contract.    
 
3. Malawi Government and Paladin Energy Limited negotiations in the 
context of influential factors 
  
3.1 An overview of the agreement 
 
 The DA was an agreement that was signed based on the concession 
system. It was concluded in accordance with section 10 of the Mines and 
Minerals Act. The parties agreed that the agreement would serve national 
interest, which is the promotion of the social and economic needs of the 
people of Malawi. 267  They also agreed that it would give PEL a stable 
investment in the country. 268 The GoM received a 15 per cent share in the 
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issued capital and agreed to the following; to build and upgrade roads around 
mine contract area and space for airplanes to land in the area close to the 
project.269 The GoM had the obligation to enforce the regulations that are set 
out in National law and other regulatory documents if PEL did not comply 
with them.270 The GoM agreed to a fiscal regime that was not limited and it 
agreed to amend the legislation that relates to this in order to reflect the 
clauses in the agreement.271  
 
 Further, the GoM agreed to do all it can to ensure that government 
notices are made to reflect the clauses in the agreement if the national law 
relating to the fiscal regime cannot be amended.272 This clause was subject to 
the stability clause and if during this period the laws are amended by the GoM 
that are better for that those in the agreement, the agreement should be 
amended to reflect these changes.273 The GoM agreed to non-discrimination 
during the stability period. 274  Both parties agreed to settlement disputes 
through negotiations and arbitration.275They also agreed to have the law of 
Malawi apply to their agreement.276 
 
PEL agreed that it would operate within the approved program of 
operation and best mining, ore processing.277 That it would make efforts to 
promote and develop local business in Malawi in order to supply it goods and 
services. 278To employ and train Malawians to help run the project and only 
employ non-Malawians if they did not possess the skills required.279 PEL was 
to give the GoM reports on its operations, finances, and geological 
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discoveries, transactions with independent parties and was agreed that all 
this information was to be classified as confidential.280 The company had to 
comply with environmental laws, abide by the environmental management 
plan and assist in establishing the administration of this plan. 281In addition, 
the company had social responsibilities, they had to develop the area around 
Kayelekera by building primary and secondary schools, houses for the 
teachers and give USD10 million to other agencies to ensure this development 
happens in other areas.282  
 
 3.2 How the factors influenced the clauses  
 
i) The applicable law 
 
 The parties agreed that laws of Malawi would be the applicable law to 
the contract. At the time of the negotiations Malawi did not have a national 
mining policy. It had development goals but this not specific to the mining 
sector.283 Thus some of the laws that applicable to the negotiation of EDAs in 
Malawi are the Constitution of the Republic of Malawi, 284Mines and Minerals 
Act [MMA] 285 , The Energy Regulation Act 286 , Environmental Protection 
Act287, and the Corrupt Practices Act.288 The most important is the MMA 
because this is the agreement that regulates the mining activities in the 
country. A country’s mining law embodies its policy towards the sector and 
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is a guide to the government and the investor on what standard is expected 
form the exploration and exploitation.  
 
 Having a mining policy helps the negotiations of EDAs.289 It offers 
guidance to what the country expects to achieve in the sector, it forms the 
expectation for the negotiators in the countries development and it also helps 
in capacity building between the different institutions so that issues that need 
to be legislated can be identified and better regulated.290It was therefore very 
important for Malawi to have had a mining policy at the time of the 
negotiations. The problems that are associated with not having a mining 
policy became evident when the contract started to operate and the clauses in 
the contract were enforced. The policy would have served as a guide and 
substantiated the law where it had gaps. The GoM started formulating a 
mining policy after much planning and consultation and it only came up with 
a concrete document in April 2013 due to many delays.  
 
 The MMA was enacted in the 1980’s the trends in mining then were 
different to what they were in 2007 and what they are now. The MMA does 
not embody Malawi’s development objectives. EDAs are now drafted with 
social and environmental concerns in mind. This means that issues like 
transparency; access information, public participation and community 
development are part of the focus when drafting these contracts. The problem 
that Malawi faced here is that the clauses that were then drafted based on 
Malawian law were not elaborate; they failed to deal with some issues 
comprehensively.  
 
                                                        




 The principle is to ensure that the contractual clauses are in line with 
national law but this is cannot be done if national law is inadequate in terms 
of the social and environmental issues. The parties agree to what they want to 
put in the contract but with national laws are incoherent or do not deal with 
some issues it increases the chances of the contract being a contract that 
supersedes national law and not offer development. If the MMA is compared 
to the laws of other countries like Tanzania and Ghana, there are many 
loopholes and gaps that can be seen in the MMA. The Mining Acts of Ghana 
and Tanzania have provisions that deal with access to information, principle 
of transparency and community development. The MMA does not have this.   
  
The MMA influenced the negotiation process because it is the 
legislation that regulates the mining activities in the country and also the law 
that the parties had to abide by when drafting the contract. It importance is 
further evidenced by the parties choice in having the Laws of Malawi as the 
applicable law, which includes the MMA. This reflects a lack of negotiating 
power and capacity on the part of GoM because the national mining 
legislation was not suitable for the negotiation of such an agreement. The 
GoM should have insisted the contract contains a specific clause on the 
applicable law. 291  There should have been Laws of Malawi and general 
principles like the UNIDROIT principles applicable to commercial contracts 
and international best practices set out for the different areas.292 These would 
then fill in the loopholes and gaps that national legislation has failed to 
address. The clause also reflects PEL negotiating skills, bargaining skills and 
strategy, they opted for laws that were not up to date to and managed to get 
the GoM to agree that such laws should be used. This is what MNCs like PEL 
do in order to evade the stricter provisions present in other legal systems. 
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 The agreement does not specifically state that the agreement is 
confidential. It’s the wording and the interpretation of the clauses that brings 
this conclusion.293 The clause deals with recording and operations, the clauses 
are drafted in such a way that the GoM is restricted in how it should treat the 
information that is supplied by the company.294A critical interpretation of the 
clause demonstrates that the GoM has an obligation to treat all information 
supplied by the company confidential. This is given more force section 7 of 
the MAA, which prohibits the disclosure of information. However, the section 
qualifies in which instances information may be disclosed which are; in 
connection with the administration of the Act or for court proceedings or for 
investigation in terms of the Act.295 In another clause dealing with accounting 
records, the GoM would have to ensure that any information they acquire 
from the company in this regard is confidential.296 This includes the revenues 
the company pays to the GoM.  
 
The clause on operations and recording was drafted in such a way that 
all the information relating to the company’s operations was confidential and 
this was used as a justification in order not to publicize some aspects of the 
companies. From this interpretation the GoM went even further and stated 
that the agreement was therefore also confidential. 297  The GoM cited a 
confidentiality clause as its reason for not disclosing the agreement to 
parliament.298 This justification is taken from legislation that is old in content 
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because it fails to adapt to the changes that have taken place in the negotiation 
and drafting of these contracts.299 
 
 It cannot be ignored that when the agreement was drafted Malawi was 
under a dictatorship and disclosure was not something the GoM promoted.300 
This refusal by the GoM then meant that the agreement was confidential and 
the public did not have access to it.301 The GoM held a press briefing stating 
that it was removing the confidentiality clause and making it public in order 
to allow openness. 302  Further reasons were that GoM wants greater 
community participation in the negotiation process and transparency.303 This 
transparency, access to the agreement and community consultation would 
then ensure better negotiation of future EDAs.304  
 
The issue has led some controversy because the GoM says there was a 
clause while PEL disputes this fact and states that the reason why the 
agreement was kept confidential was ‘…at the request of the government’ not 
under a clause of the agreement.305 This means that it is the GoM that chose 
to interpret the agreement like this because the political leadership that was 
ruling at the time stood to gain immense from the agreement. PELs also stated 
that it had no problem with making the agreement open and stated that it 
would not affect its operations.306  
  
 The political leadership influenced the clause; section 1 of the MMA 
states that al natural resources are held by the president. This means that 
                                                        
299 PJ Kamlongera The mining boom in Malawi: implications for community development’ (2013) 48 3  
Community Development Journal 377 at 385. 
300 Ibid. 
301 C Kandiero ‘Kayelekera secrecy provision scrapped’ Daily Times 2 January 2014. 
302 Ibid. 
303 Statement by Minister of Mines John Bande. 
304 C Kandiero op cit (note 316.) 




he/she will be involved in the management of the natural resources and in 
this case it was direct management. The presence of PEL in Malawi, the price 
of uranium and the global position PEL had as a uranium producer were all 
incentives that motivated the political leadership. This started from the way 
the license was given before the EIA was approved.307  
 
 Other factors include weak governance, which then means that 
transparency and accountability were not emphasized. The GoM did not 
really open up the contracting process or regulate the company to give people 
information. The fact that the government allowed a clause so broadly drafted 
and it later removes it to make the agreement public means that these factors 
were lacking. Further by allowing such a broad clause, which leads to wide 
interpretation and thus justification, is an indication the lack negotiation 
skills. The clause also reflects PEL’s strategy, it is a company that does not 
promote transparency or like the EITI.308 
 
iii) Environmental matters and employment safety 
 
 PEL has to do an environmental management plan [EMP]. 309  The 
problems with this area started before the negotiation process began. In the 
agreement it is not clearly stated how PEL has to go about doing this plan.310 
The Environmental Protection Act does not give any guidance either.311 So the 
company was not properly regulated in terms of what the plan must deal 
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with, how it should be prepared and approved and the review process and 
updates.312 If the GoM had insisted of a detailed EMP it would have been 
easier to regulate PELs actions. The DA provides for an environmental bond, 
which pays compensation in instances where the company fails to meet its 
obligations.  
 
 The DA also deals with employment safety. 313  The reference to 
Malawian law is a limitation. The laws in Malawi are not adequate in 
providing protection in terms of occupational safety and health.314 There was 
a need to include international standard and practices to provide further 
protection in case national law is not enough. This clause has to be read with 
the non-discrimination clause and it terms of that clause GoM has to protect 
PEL’s interests before Malawi’s interests or that of Malawians. 315 
 
 There should have been more in the EMP because no detail is provided 
as to the employment and safety plan. 316   Further to this there is a 
discrimination clause, which affects the application of the employment and 
safety was of Malawi. This clause is tied to the on non- discrimination and like 
the environment clause the GoM cannot take action that is goes against the 
interests of PEL, it must consider these are paramount before the citizens of 
Malawi. 317  
 
 The clauses reflects the inadequacy in the national law, because the 
GoM was unable to set out proper parameter in which PEL was to fulfil its 
obligations and they showed no concern because they did not even rely on 
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the international standards. In this clause PEL’s strategy is clear to commit to 
minimum obligations in order to later claim that they have fulfilled the 
obligations and anything beyond that is not in the DA. 318  It thus further 
reflects that PEL had a stronger stance of bargaining power and negotiating 
skills compared to the GoM because they failed to protect the interest of the 
people in ensure that the environment and their livelihood from working for 




 The tax regime set forth in the DA is very different from what the MMA 
and the Taxation Act state.319 This clause puts the DA above national law 
because the agreed figures on revenues are different than those in national 
law.320The even though they fall outside national law the obligations accepted 
by the GoM are too high. For example the government has to revise the 
Taxation Act and to recognize that the DA is outside the parameters of the 
Act.321 The failure in the GoM to do this will mean that as a shareholder in the 
project it not get its equity share.322 These clauses are tied to the stability 
clause, which will be discussed later. In terms of the fiscal regime the changes 
cannot take place until the stability period elapses and if there are revisions 
in the fiscal regime they should not be against.323 So where there are changed 
made by the GoM if they are profitable to the Company they should be 
changed in the DA to reflect this. 
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 This clause reflects lack of bargaining power, negotiating skills and 
PEL’s strategy to the negotiations. The GoM should have focused on 
balancing the interests of the people of Malawi and those of PEL. In giving 
PEL such tax incentives they lessened the revenues they were going to be 
getting. This clause with the environmental and social responsibility clause 
demonstrates that the GoM did not balance the interest as they meant to. 
Contracts like DA’s are drafted for different reasons and in some cases they 
supersede national law, which was the case for Malawi. The GoM should have 
ensured that it balanced the interest of community development and the tax 
regime. In addition, the lack of transparency and limited public participation 
is evident from the figures in the tax regime itself. It is clear that the GoM had 






v) Social responsibility 
 
This clause relates to the company’s obligation towards the 
communities. The company has several obligations which include the 
constructing and upgrading of different facilities and infrastructure the 
obligations the company has taken on to fulfil are not coherent. 324  The 
company can easily get way with doing the bare minimum because the 
mechanisms to regulate the company in this area are weak and the company 
can easily find loophole in order to fulfil its obligations.  
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The company is meant to give the GoM a social responsibility plan, like 
the EMP there is no proper detail or regulation of this plan.325 The clause is 
specific in what the company will do in some areas but it fails to build on areas 
and outline them properly. For example doctors will be trained in Australia 
and the company’s obligation ends there and the GoM did not take it up to 
ensure that the doctors will indeed stay in Karonga.326 
 
The DA requires a great level of attention to be given to the protection 
and care of the communities.327 This clause does is not articulate in what it 
seeks to achieve for the community, it is specific in the training of medical 
personal but even this is uncertain. The clause states that the community 
should have trained medical personal so that they could handle cases that 
arise from the mine but there is no further detail on what mechanisms will be 
put in place in a separate document to substantiate this. The clause creates 
room for minimum compliance by the company or justification on why they 
should not fully comply with this responsibility. 328 
 
 In this clause the company’s obligations are very broad and this is a 
problem with most of the terms that relate to the social obligations that have 
to be taken by the company.329 This clause is the one that was supposed to 
provide the community with feasible development. The company had said it 
will fund schools but there is no further detail to this. There is no proper 
involvement of the community in order to develop their own area or the 
government direct involvement.330 The only thing the government will do is 
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to receive reports; there is no mention of what that will then do after receiving 
such reports.331  The clause should outline properly what the company is 
obligated to do and where it does not meet these obligations mechanism 
would be in place to address this. The failures reflected are weak negotiating 
skills, PEL strategy and poor regulation and weak intuitions.  
 
This clause reflects the inadequacy in national law, the law failed to 
provide the GoM with a proper standard that would have added to the detail 
of the clause. The GoM chose not to use international standards to fill in the 
gaps. This clause reflects a lack of negotiation skills. PEL’ strategy is evident 
here; even though they made detailed undertakings of what they would do it 
was minimal where the DA is viewed holistically. The clause also 
demonstrates that the GoM failed to regulate PEL and the fact there are no 
stringent regulations to hold companies like PEL to internationally or locally, 




 In this clause the GoM agreed not to change the laws in a way that 
negatively obstructs the company’s operations.333  The clause is tied to other 
clauses in the agreement. The drafting of new environmental laws is affected 
by this clause and this affects the improvement of the EMP.334 Stability clauses 
are still being used but it is the balancing of interests that is important. The 
interpretation of the stability clause and the other clauses in the contract, like 
the environmental clause and the non-discrimination clause fail to reflect this. 
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The stability clause is too detailed compared to the other clauses that should 
have received the same amount of attention.  
 
The clause should protect the company against arbitrary and 
discriminatory treatment and not limit the GoM right to make laws and 
regulations that will ensure that the company will meet its social and 
environmental area is no longer right. 335  To achieve proper social and 
economic development laws and regulations relation to these areas must be 
given room to be adjusted.  
 
 The problem with the stability clause is that it applies to other clauses 
in the agreement and it creates problems for the GoM operations. The 
problem with the stability clause it is that it does not balance the interests of 
the GoM and PEL. The clause is very much in favour of PEL. The clause 
demonstrates the lack of bargaining power and negotiation skills on the part 
of the GoM, the companies bargaining power and the PEL’s strategy and lack 
of proper strict regulation of PELs operations in HCs  
 
vii) Resettlement and non-discrimination 
 
The company is obligated to resettle people but how this is to be done 
is not detailed. 336  The resettlement clause was drafted with very little 
consideration for the people living in these areas.337 The only detail given is 
that when people are moved the company should resettle them. A plan 
should have been done by PEL explain how people will be resettle the GoM 
should have insisted on this as part of its conditions to the agreement.  
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In resettling people the actions of PEL were not above board. They met 
with the chiefs and they asked them to remove the people quickly in order to 
start operations.338They did this by bribing them and the money they gave to 
the people that moved was very little to sustain their new lives.339 The clause 
reflects the lack of adequate mining laws in Malawi, the lack of negotiating 
skills of the GoM, the existence of weak institutions in Malawi that would 
regulate PEL’s actions.340 It further reflects the strategy PEL had.  
 
The non- discriminatory action clause is also a broad one; it fails to take 
into account the GoM rights.341 The clause states that the GoM cannot take 
any discriminatory action against PEL during and after the stability period 
even after the stability period the GoM is restricted from making such 
discriminatory law to PEL and any company mining the same mineral as 
PEL.342 This clause reflects the lack of negotiation skills and bargaining power, 
and inadequacy in the national law and weak institutions. From this clause 
GoM cannot take any action that interferes with PEL’s operations in Malawi. 
Thus the GoM cannot make laws that relate to - for example - the 
environmental and safety standards.  
 
 The clauses reflect these different factors and what is important 
here is that there was no consideration of Malawi’s development objectives.343 
If they were the GoM would have properly regulated the resettlement of the 
people and the non-discrimination clause would have had limited 
application. 
                                                        
338 Tilitonse Final Report op cit (note 348) at 19. 
339 Ibid. 
340 P Kamlongera op cit (note 314) at 385. 
341 The Malawi/ Paladin Energy Agreement op cit (note 282) at clause 26. 
342 VCC Comments op cit (note 308) at 17. 
343 R Hajat  (2007) ‘Malawi and its minerals: are Malawians benefiting? Resource’ (2007) 2 Resource 






The termination clause should have been clear, the obligations that PEL 
has are not as stringent as they should be for such an agreement.344 Currently 
operations have been suspended, PEL cited ‘…weak international spot prices’ 
for yellow cake and the losses the mine has been making.345  If PEL then 
decides to terminate the agreement following the suspension, the obligations 
for such termination are in the PEL’s favour. This is not good for Malawi 
because even at termination the country will fail to reasonably benefit. . 346 
This demonstrates a lack of bargaining power and negotiating skills, the GoM 
has conceded on several important areas by not asking for more elaborate 
terms and conditions. They should have considered this clause a little more, 
even if the parties drafted a separate document. The plan would have helped 
the GoM deal with any eventualities.  
 
ix) Indemnity from the company and review of the agreement 
 
 The clause on indemnity should have been drafted in a broader way. 
The clause covers the claim the GoM may have in the case of non-compliance 
by PEL.347This clause is very important because it ties itself to the obligations 
PEL has undertaken relating to the environment, resettlement and social 
responsibility. This would have aided the institutions; it would have ensured 
that PEL is held accountable where it does not meet its obligations. The clause 
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345 T Sabola ‘ Shareholders’ approval not required – Paladin’ The Daily Times 27 February 2014. 
346 The Malawi/ Paladin Energy Agreement  op cit (note 282) at Clause 30. 
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reflects the lack of negotiation skills and information. It should have been 
drafted better.348 
 
 The clause on reviewing the agreement should also have been drafted 
better. There should have been periods set that allow for constant review. This 
would then ensure that the changes that each party has under gone are 
included in the contract. This clause was very important for the GoM. The 
clauses they have conceded to be broadly drafted would then be given 
detailed here after the contract has been reviewed. This then would justify the 
strategy they took in allowing PEL to commit so broadly to the social and 
environmental issues. This clause reflects a lack of negotiating skills and lack 





3.3 The clauses that were excluded  
 
In order to ensure that the DA added to the goal of achieving sustainable 





 There is a need to make transparency a priority in such agreements 
even if Malawi had not become an Extractive Industries Transparency 
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Initiative [EITI] compliant.349 The EITI is only a policy mechanism, which can 
only work through government efforts that needs the work of the government 
to enforce it in its institutions.350 In order to do this the government must first 
emphasize the important of the principle of transparency in the agreements it 
signs. Thus the GoM should have started with emphasizing the principle of 
transparency. It would then not have had to back track and contradict itself 
as it has done with regards to the DA. This principle had been cemented by 
the time the agreement was being negotiated so it should have been included. 
This would then have narrowed the interpretation of the confidentiality of the 
agreement.  
 
ii) Bond guarantee 
 
 This bond is given to the government of the HC in order to protect it. 
IT stands as security.351 When the company is established in the HC, it is not 
the parent company and the assets that are registered within the HC.352  The 
parent company is not the one in the HC and it is usually the one with the 
resource to operate the project and the assets. 353  This bond works, as 
guarantee to the GoM that it can access funds in cases where the company 
does not meet its obligations. 354 
 
iii) Community development 
 
                                                        
349  Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative Complaint countries list available at 
http://www.eiti.org/countires, accessed on 4 March 2014. 
350 G Hilson & R Maconachie ‘Good Governance’ and the extractive industries in sub Saharan Africa’ 
(2009) 30 Mineral Processing & Extractive Metall. Review: 52. 






 It is now a common trend to ensure that the MNC develops the 
community. 355 There is not much in the agreement except the social 
responsibility assessment. 356 The mining operations need to include 
community consideration and development as a precondition. This 
guarantees the sufficient working of the project.357 If this is not included it 
leaves a lot of room for PEL to escape its obligations. This clause is necessary 
because the communities themselves will directly influence it. The exclusion 
of this clause is a reflection of the GoM’s failure to apply the principles of 
transparency and accountability as it failed to even to follow the minimal 
regulations it put in place for consultations to be done.  
 
iv) Social impact assessment 
 
 These agreements should also include Social impact assessment, which 
are based on the assessments done in the social management place.358 The 
company prepares this plan in consultation with the communities and 
government. - It gives a detailed outline of the company’s plans to mitigate 
potential adverse economic and social impacts. 
 
v) Compliance with human rights violations and corruption 
 
 There should have been a clause that specifically outlines how PEL 
would be monitored to prevent any violation of human rights and should it 
be found promoting corrupt practices. These would have ensured that the 
people of Malawi that live and work in the area of the project are protected. 
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 The fact that such clauses were not included is a reflection on the 
failure of the GoM to negotiate these contracts properly; it can also be 
attributed to the lack of information, capacity and bargaining power to 
effectively negotiate such contracts.  
   
4. Implementation of the agreement 
 
 The implementation of agreement has demonstrated that it was 
concluded on terms that do not serve Malawi’s development objectives. The 
clauses that were agreed upon should have been negotiated to promote these 
objectives. However they were not properly drafted because they fail to 
clearly outline what the company will do as it course of action and what 
mechanisms are in place to regulate the company. The unfairness in the terms 
agreed upon arises because they fail to meet these objectives. What makes 
them unfair is the content. The clauses in the agreement failed to balance the 
interest of the parties, they seem to favour PEL. The obligations that the GoM 
expects from PEL are not clearly outlined but those the GoM has to fulfil are 
more strict and detailed. The GoM had the opportunity to insist on better 
terms but it was the GoM actions at the time that led to such clauses being 
badly drafted. The negotiations of the agreement were done in secret, the 
GoM refused to provide parliament with details on the agreement and they 
disregarded the long term interests of community in Kayelekera. 
 
At implementation is when the problems started to appear. There are 
no terms that deal with any ‘…potential adverse economic and social impacts 
on…’ the community.359 Implementation has revealed discrepancies in the 
agreement that will not produce sustainable development. The agreement 
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does not comprehensively outline human rights and governance violations 
like corruption.360  
 
In the agreement it was agreed that the government would collect 
revenues from the project in order to advance their development agenda. In 
the agreement Paladin got the following incentives; reduced corporate 
income tax rate, no resource rent tax, reduced royalties to 1.5 per cent amongst 
other tax incentives.361 In comparison the GoM received a 15 percent stake in 
the project. So for the beginning the company is paying very little revenues 
than it should for such an agreement. At the negotiation the focus was on the 
revenues to make sure that the investor is attracted and kept interested. It was 
the GoM hope that this area would bring the most economical changes. Little 
attention was paid to the other areas like the environment and the social 
factors like labour and human rights.362 
 
From the revenues it is estimated that Malawi has lost $205 million 
since the project started operating and are set to lose a total of $281 million 
over the next 6 years as the project has been running for 7 years.363 This loss 
is felt in the lack of improvement in services and development in crucial 
sectors like health and communal development like schools.364 The collection 
and monitoring of the revenues is not done properly. The existence of weak 
institutions is a part of the problem and so is the lack of transparency in the 
monitoring and collection of the revenues.365 
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 MNCs have the power in some instances to get the results they want 
and they can ensure that the government or the public will not obstruct their 
operations. PEL has made sure so far that the important areas or areas that 
are prone to probing and public criticism were drafted in its favour. MNC can 
also choose a particular legal system because they know that the laws do not 
regulate certain areas properly and with the issue of having weak governance 
and institutions there is a lot that will not be monitored. 
 
5.  The way forward  
  
The GoM intends to enter into more EDAs because this development 
of mineral resources is part of its development agenda. It therefore needs to 
first update the current mining law to embody its development objective. The 
current law has too many gaps and loopholes. 366  The use of this law to 
negotiate future EDAs will not achieve social and economic development. The 
law fails to work with other laws to ensure that these issues ensure are 
comprehensively drafted in agreements with investors and the investors 
commit to as set of obligations that demonstrates careful consideration of 
these issues. The steps to amending the MMA have been slow and stagnant; 
the continued delays in this area will lead to more shortcomings in other 
EDAs the GoM plans on signing.367 
  
 Due to the in adequacy in this regard the MAA allows issues like 
corruption to fester and reduces transparency and accountability. The 
legislation should therefore be amended to reflect Malawi’s development 
goals, there should be provisions of consultation with the public, the 
communities in which mining will take place must be compensated on a 
properly calculated scheme, there should be a commitment to protect these 
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communities and the laws and regulate the action of companies like PEL. So 
the emphasis should be on greater mineral resource management and 
governance and sustainable development through the enacting of law that 
reflects this commitment. An example of a country that has found a balance 
between attracting investors and maximizing benefits in mining to benefit the 
whole country is Botswana. 368 The law did away ministerial discretion, which 
has the tendency to encourage corrupt practices.369 Other areas involved in 
mining were also updated like geological surveys; the institutions involved 
manage their duties because there has been a proper allocation of duties and 
responsibilities. 370  The government has managed to receive’…favourable 
terms…’ from an agreement with De beers a South Africa company that mines 
diamonds. 371 
 
 There should be greater emphasis in transparency from the initial 
stages of negotiation process to the collection and monitoring of revenues.  
This can happen with the amendment of the current mining laws. The GoM 
should really enforce its decision to make future contacts public and allow 
community participation. This will lessen confusion and the need to fabricate 
information like what happened with the confidentiality clause in the DA. 
There will be more information because the company will have to produce a 
report before it commences the project and this will based on extensive 
consultations that have been monitored by the GoM.  
 
 An example is the Democratic Republic of Congo. The GoM should 
take lessons from Congo who insisted that several contracts it had concluded 
should be disclosed.372 One of the agreements was between the government 
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of the Democratic Republic of Congo and TenkeFungurume Mining. The 
GoM should also commit to make all other agreements signed with other 
companies public, where if it cannot it should outline justifiable reasons that 
should include the protection and advancement of national interest. The taxes 
that agreed upon should be reviewed in public consultation of stakeholders 
that would able to give a value input. Further steps should be taken to join 
the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, which lays out the 
standards that a country that wants to develop this sector should follow. 
 
 Malawi needs to create greater understanding for the negotiation of 
DA. Resources need to be put in the development of the process. There is a 
need to equip the negotiators with expertise and skills on how to handle such 
agreements. Further training needs to be done and external consultation from 
other countries and people in the field. The political leadership needs to 
commit to the development of this sector in the right way so sustainable 
development takes place.  This therefore means that there should be a greater 
level of political detachment and separation of tasks. The creation of the 
Ministry of mining in 2012 was a good step but now this institution needs to 
be strengthened. The negotiators should be people who are there to further 
national interest for development and not to act as loyalists to the political 
leadership. An example is the agreement between National Transition 
government of Liberia and Mittal. 
 
 Malawi can take lessons from Ghana; the government signed an 
agreement with AngloGold Ashanti.373 This company has been operating in 
an area called Obuasi. 374  The development that has been realized in the 
community of Obuasi is tremendous compared to the other cities in Ghana.375 
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The reasons are that the company has committed to developing the area.376 
This is because the government has been able to regulate the company’s 
operations in the country and to hold them accountable. This has been able to 
happen because the government was committed to the development of the 
sector by involving the public, aligning its development policy with the 
negotiation of the contracts and making the social issues one of the prominent 
issues in the contract.  These are strategies from which Malawi can learn. The 
GoM cannot continue to view the NGO’s as organizations that anti-





 The NMLRF in Malawi provide the basis on which EDA negotiations 
can be done. The problem however is that the current legislation does not 
properly outline Malawi’s development objectives for mining, which is 
crucial. The problems in the legislation have led to loopholes and gaps that 
have added to the existence of weak institutions and accountability measures. 
Transparency and accountability have not been properly monitored and 
enforced and this has led to corruption in different parts of the negotiation 
process.   
 
The policy that the government has drafted will assist the negotiators 
and the drafters of the new legislation. The new legislation for mining will 
then aid in shifting the focus from just acquiring revenues from the mining 
contract. It will assist the government in balancing its own interests and those 
of the investor. The new legislation will thus be able to regulate the MNCs 
that the GoM concludes contracts with. The clauses that will be drafted will 
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be in line with Malawi’s development goals, which are what the GoM sets out 
to achieve when they negotiate such contacts.  
 
 The GoM/PEL agreement raised a lot of issues not only in terms of the 
legislation that was there at the time. The clauses that were drafted have 
revealed that the negotiation process can be influenced by other factors. The 
GoM was unable to negotiate and bargain for better terms because the 
legislation that the contract was supposed to be in line with was not adequate 
to reflect this. The environment that the contract was negotiated in was not 
conducive for such negotiations this problem is also attributed to the 
government’s actions. The lack of concern for transparency, accountability 
and commit to the separation of duties arose because the government chose 
to neglect them.  
  
 The failure to properly negotiate this contract is not entirely because of 
lack of negotiation skills and capacity. There was also a lot of influence from 
the political leadership. It is therefore important that the GoM updates the 
legislation in order to ensure that the contract that are negotiated with the 
legislation in mind achieve some reasonable gain for the people of Malawi as 
the contract is influenced by the mining legislation. In addition the 
government should respect the separation of duties that exist. The creation of 
the Ministry of mining is a good step.  Institutions like this need to be strength 





CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDAITONS 
 
 The aim of this dissertation was to analyse and critically discuss the 
factors that influence the negotiation of EDAs in Africa with a focus on 
Malawi as one of the countries that have signed such a contract. In order 
to achieve this there was need to understand of EDAs as private contracts 
concluded with the state. In doing so the progression of these contracts 
was done to explain how such contracts became to be known as EDAs. 
This was from the revision and restructuring that took place in the old 
concession contracts, which gave birth to various new forms of 
agreements that were used in different sectors of a country. These 
contracts are mostly used in the mineral resource sector. The term EDA is 
linked to the economic development these contracts seek to achieve as this 
is the primal focus of the contract. Thus the contract can still be based on 
the new concession system or any of the new agreements being joint 
ventures, production sharing contracts or service contracts. If they 
however have economic development as goals they will be called EDAs.  
 
The conclusion of these contracts is based on several reasons, and the 
one of which is that most CRIMRs in Africa cannot finance the projects in 
the mining sector. A further problem, which has now arisen, is the 
negotiation of these contracts. The negotiation process is influenced by 
several factors and one of the prevalent factors that has been identified is 
the lack of adequate legislation that deals with the countries develop 
objective. The current trend when negotiating these contracts is the 
inclusion of provisions that deal with community development, the 
environment and human rights. Several CRIMRs like Botswana, Ghana 
and Tanzania have made this realization and the laws in their countries 
reflect this. The management and development of the mineral sector is a 
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long and hard process but these countries have shown their commitment 
through the enactment of such legislation.  
 
 Legislation is only one of the factors that influence the negotiation 
process. Most CRIMRs have weak institutions, these fail to manage the 
sector properly because they do not have enough resources. In the case 
studied weak institutions exist because proper governance in Malawi is 
weak. The political leadership further undermines the institutions during 
the negotiation process and this is one of the reasons why the institutions 
are weak. Those in high positions do not commit to providing capacity 
building measures to these institutions and then when the time comes to 
negotiate the EDAs they undermine the duties of the institutions. This 
then makes it difficult for such institutions to properly monitor and 
regulate the MNC. 
 
 The failure to regulate the MNC is also attributed to the fact there are 
no stringent laws that the MNC can be held accountable to which 
operations in the HC. The international framework that is available allows 
room for the MNC to make a chose not to comply or not. The MNC is also 
given room to get away with the basic minimum. This is something that 
PEL did in the DA. The GoM failed to also enact legislation or put in place 
measures that would regulate PEL behaviour in Malawi. The government 
could have done this by insisting on the clause that relate to Malawi’s 
objectives to be drafted in detail. This would have ensured that they can 
easily hold PEL to its obligations and not allow the company to use the 
loophole they have found in the mining legislation as a strategy. 
 
 The mining legislation in Malawi is in need of revision if EDA 
negotiations are going to achieve sustainable results and to ensure proper 
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management of the sector. The existence of this legislation has failed to 
work with other areas that are affected by mining. This failure has meant 
that the regulation and accountability measures that were in place at the 
time were very weak. This is because the institutions are mean to 
administer such measures are weak as well. This then means that 
corruption and bribery take effect. The political intervention does not help 
the situation either. The existence of these factors comes from the fact the 
government does not give priority to the development and management 
of the sector; it does not allocate enough financial resources for capacity 
building and training of negotiators. 
 
  In addition within the negotiations there is also the problem of having 
little information; the company gave the geological information that the 
GoM had to them. This problem goes back to the issue of capacity. When 
then the negotiators start the negotiations they do so in an environment 
that does not help them to achieve results that will safeguard national 
interest. The environment created by the political leadership’s interference 
did not help in the GoM/PEL negotiations. The existence of weak 
governance, institution, accountability measures and transparency added 
to this. This then means that the power the GoM had to negotiation was 
not strong, the capacity to do so was tilt in PEL’s favour.  
 
 These problems are being realized now after the GoM has seen the 
problems that have been identified within the clauses of the agreement 
through the management of the project.  Through the analysis of the DA 
it has been discovered that some of the problems were created in the 
negotiation process because this is where the parties met to discuss the 
terms. The GoM has now decided to improve the negotiation process of 
next agreements they sign by using external expertise, wider consultation 




 The new legislation will assist in building the sector because it will 
contain a balance between the need to development the sector for the 
nation and the desire to attract the investor. The concessions that Malawi 
will make will be based on its development goals and not unilateral action 
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